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Note
SHAWE v. ELTING: THE IMPERFECT SALE OF
TRANSPERFECT GLOBAL, INC.
SARAH M. SAMAHA
INTRODUCTION
In Shawe v. Elting,1 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Court
of Chancery properly exercised its equitable powers under Delaware’s custodian statute when, upon finding the presence of shareholder and director
deadlock, it appointed a custodian to sell a massively profitable corporation
to a third party.2 Phillip Shawe and Elizabeth Elting were the co-founders,
co-CEOs, and the only two directors of TransPerfect Global, Inc.3 The
closely held corporation was structured such that Shawe and Elting behaved
as fifty-fifty owners of the company.4 In the absence of a written agreement
governing the rights of stockholders,5 the personal and business relationships between Shawe and Elting devolved into irresolvable dysfunction,
and the parties were left with no intra-corporate recourse.6 In the litigation
that ensued, the Court of Chancery found that the deadlock between Shawe
and Elting satisfied the threshold requirements of Section 226 of the Dela© 2018 Sarah M. Samaha.
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1. 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017).
2. Id. at 160.
3. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB,
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Shawe v. Elting, 157
A.3d 152 (Del. 2017).
4. Id. at *6.
5. Id. at *9.
6. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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ware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”)7 and appointed a custodian to
force a sale of the multi-million dollar corporation to a third party, despite
Shawe’s objections.8 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the decision,
holding that the custodian statute’s grant of power was broad enough to authorize the Court of Chancery to issue such a remedy.9
The Delaware Supreme Court erred in two respects. First, the court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s expansive reasoning with respect to the “irreparable harm” requirement of Section 226(a)(2).10 In doing so, it ignored
longstanding jurisprudence requiring a demonstration of imminent insolvency or loss of revenue to the corporation in question, and instead accepted the Court of Chancery’s proposition that irreparable harm may encompass things like severely diminished employee morale, client skepticism,
and failure to benefit from proposed acquisitions.11 The court focused on
this erroneous interpretation of irreparable harm expansively, despite the
fact that custodianship was warranted regardless under Section 226(a)(1).12
This Note argues that this nonessential dictum seems to have been used to
illustrate some degree of proportionality between the alleged harm to the
corporation and the extremity of the remedy ordered.13
Second, the court improperly affirmed the Court of Chancery’s grant
of expansive custodial authority.14 Section 226 jurisprudence indicates the
reluctance with which Delaware courts have ordered the intrusive custodianship remedy, and emphasizes the principle that a custodian’s authority
should be as narrowly tailored as possible.15 The court accepted a custodial
sale as the only means of appropriate relief without first implementing viable alternative remedies.16 Further, in holding as it did, the court failed to
recognize that the language and prior application of Section 226 does not
provide stockholders with notice that a remedy as drastic as a forced sale of
their company might occur, absent their consent.17

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a) (1953).
In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *106.
Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 160 (Del. 2017).
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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I. THE CASE
A. The Company and the Parties
In re Shawe & Elting LLC18 concerned TransPerfect Global, Inc.
(“TransPerfect” or “the Company”), a Delaware corporation specializing in
translation services, website localization, and litigation support.19 The
Company’s breadth is global, spanning ninety-two offices in eighty-six cities worldwide and employing more than 3,500 full-time employees.20 In
2014, after a period of steadily profitable growth, the Company’s revenue
exceeded an all-time high of $470 million, and its net income totaled $79.8
million.21
Elizabeth Elting and Philip Shawe—formerly engaged to be married—
founded the Company and served as its co-CEOs.22 They also served as the
only two members of the board of directors.23 Of the Company’s 100
shares of common stock, Elting owned fifty, Shawe owned forty-nine, and
Shawe’s mother, Shirley Shawe (“Ms. Shawe”) owned the remaining
share.24 Shawe treated his mother’s share as his own,25 and the court found
that Shawe and Elting “behaved functionally at all times relevant to this
case as if they were 50-50 owners of [the Company].”26 Shawe and Elting
“never entered into any written agreements governing the operations of the
Company or their relationship as stockholders, such as a buy/sell agreement.”27 Shawe and Elting led separate service divisions, and their respective divisions accounted for roughly equal percentages of the company’s
revenue in 2013 and 2014.28

18. No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211
(Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015).
19. Id. at *4.
20. Id. TransPerfect also maintains a network of more than 10,000 translators, editors, and
proofreaders working in approximately 170 different languages. Id.
21. Id. at *10.
22. Id. at *4.
23. Id.
24. Id. at *4–5.
25. Id. at *5. The court observed that, in 2014, “[Shawe] held a proxy giving him the ‘full
and complete power to exercise at any time . . . any and all rights to and/or arising from or connected with’ [his mother’s] share of [the Company].” Id.
26. Id. at *6.
27. Id. at *9.
28. Id.

2018]

SHAWE v. ELTING

903

B. A Timeline of Events: Tensions, Disagreements, and “Mutual
Hostaging”
Tensions between Shawe and Elting began as early as their broken engagement in 1997, five years after they founded the Company in their college dormitory room.29 When Elting ended her relationship with Shawe,
Shawe began acting bizarrely—his behavior included crawling under Elting’s bed and staying there for a period of time, showing up unannounced at
Elting’s hotel room in Argentina, and inviting himself to Elting’s wedding
in Jamaica.30 Personal differences bled into Shawe and Elting’s professional relationship, and early disagreements began over things such as the way
company assets were spent31 and the proposed opening of global satellite
offices.32 By late 2012, the disagreements between Shawe and Elting escalated into what Shawe described as “mutual hostaging,” a process by which
“Elting would hold things up that Shawe wanted unless she got certain
things that she wanted, and vice versa.”33 In November of 2012, for example, Elting rejected the proposed acquisition of a company called Rixon—
despite its value to TransPerfect34—when Shawe declined to approve a $10
million non-tax distribution requested by Elting.35 Further, though “boardlevel decisions” historically required the approval of both CEOs, the relationship between the two deteriorated such that Elting “insisted that routine
decisions must receive their ‘dual approval.’”36
The pattern of “mutual hostaging” between the two CEOs continued
into 2013, at which point there still existed no buy/sell agreement.37 In ear29. Id. at *7.
30. Id. at *7–8 n.12.
31. Id. at *10–11. Disagreement of this nature occurred in 2011 when Elting learned that
Shawe spent some of the Company’s American Express membership points on an expensive plane
ticket for his fiancée without her approval. Id. Elting also “became upset when she learned that
Shawe had submitted raises for certain employees without her approval.” Id. at *12.
32. Id. at *13–14. One particularly heated exchange occurred in 2012, when Elting rejected
Shawe’s proposal to open an office in France because of the area’s employment laws. Id. In response, Shawe threatened to freeze the Company’s accounts and shut down the Company. See id.
at *14 (quoting heated emails from Shawe to Elting). Ultimately, Elting relented to Shawe’s request. Id.
33. Id. at *15.
34. The Company’s head of sales referred to the acquisition as “fantastic” and implored Elting to “please . . . not derail that one.” Id. at *16.
35. Id. at *15.
36. Id. at *17–18. The dual approval requirement resulted in cross-division meddling. Id. at
*18. In other words, Shawe would meddle with the demands that Elting had for her respective
division (such as raises for certain employees within her umbrella of leadership), and vice versa.
Id.
37. Id. at *22. A buy/sell agreement governs shareholder exits in a closely held business by
“provid[ing] a firm method of liquidating a shareholder’s interest upon appropriate events.” Kerry
M. Lavelle, Drafting Shareholder Agreements for the Closely-Held Business, 4 DEPAUL BUS. L.J.
109, 111 (1991).
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ly October of 2013, Shawe threatened to terminate Gale Boodram, the
Company’s payroll manager,38 if she executed a wire transfer to make a distribution to the Company’s stockholders without his consent—an act endorsed by Elting.39 Elting retaliated by terminating the Company’s Chief
Operating Officer, who she claimed had interfered with the wire transfer.40
Subsequently, Elting retained a corporate lawyer to help her communicate
with Shawe and suggested that Shawe do the same.41 Shawe belittled Elting’s proposal as “her latest tantrum” and an idea that was “batsh*t crazy.”42 Shawe then terminated the “Company’s real estate broker [of] twenty years”—an “obvious retaliation,” since Elting’s husband was in the
broker’s employ.43 Countless feuds and another failed compromise later,
Shawe began to surreptitiously monitor Elting’s private emails.44 Shawe
repeatedly and secretly entered Elting’s locked office in her absence to dismantle her computer, remove and copy its hard drive, and then reinstall it.45
He further “arranged to access the hard drive on her office computer remotely.”46
Shawe and Elting’s corporate in-fighting persisted, resulting in deadlock over expenses not approved by both parties,47 personal legal representation,48 and employee hiring and compensation processes.49 One of the
consequences of such deadlock was the double payment of Elting’s taxes by
the Company,50 apparently attributable to the fact that “Shawe and Elting
38. Shawe repeatedly accused Boodram of showing favoritism to Elting and viewed her as
“Elting’s ‘puppet.’” In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *24, *29.
39. Id. at *30.
40. Id.
41. Id. at *31.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *40.
45. Id. at *40–41.
46. Id. at *41. Through Shawe’s “stealthy actions,” he accessed approximately 19,000 of
Elting’s emails, including approximately 12,000 privileged communications with her personal
counsel in this litigation. Id. at *42.
47. See id. at *44–45 (explaining that Shawe refused to participate in the Company’s “trueup process,” a process by which (1) all unagreed-upon expenses incurred by both CEOs were tallied and (2) proportional distributions in the form of additional compensation were made to each
party).
48. See id. at *47–48 (explaining that Shawe retained the Company’s outside counsel “to represent him personally in his dispute with Elting” while “incredibly claim[ing] not to see any conflict”).
49. See id. at *51–53 (explaining that Shawe (1) unilaterally hired a senior executive into one
of Elting’s divisions despite Elting’s objections and (2) authorized a finance manager to provide
certain employee raises without obtaining Elting’s approval).
50. TransPerfect was reorganized in 2007 as a Subchapter S corporation. Id. at *8. Instead
of paying federal income taxes, Subchapter S corporations’ income or losses “are divided among
and passed through to its stockholders in proportion to their holdings.” Id. Stockholders must
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were incapable of behaving rationally.”51 Another consequence was the
termination of the Company’s relationship with its public relations firm—a
replacement for which Shawe and Elting were subsequently unable to agree
upon.52 Finally, in May of 2014, the Shawe-Elting feud culminated in four
separate lawsuits which they filed against each other.53
C. Brief Procedural History
On May 23, 2014, Elting petitioned the Delaware Court of Chancery
to (1) appoint a custodian to sell the Company under Section 226(a)(2) of
the DGCL54 or (2) equitably dissolve the Company.55 Several months later,
pursuant to Section 211 of the DGCL,56 Elting filed an action to compel the
Company to hold an annual stockholder’s meeting (“the Section 211 Action”).57 To resolve the Section 211 Action, the parties58 “stipulated that
they were deadlocked on electing directors.”59 Subsequently, Elting filed
another action under Section 226(a)(1) of the Delaware Code,60 seeking
“the appointment of a custodian or receiver to act in the best interests of
[the Company] given the stipulated deadlock among the Company’s stockholders over the election of directors.”61 After a six-day trial in February of
2015, the Court of Chancery appointed a corporate attorney as a mediator to
negotiate a resolution between the two parties.62 Shawe and Elting were
then report the income or loss on their personal income tax returns and are compensated by the
corporation with pro rata tax distributions. Id.
51. Id. at *55.
52. Id. at *56.
53. Id. at *56–57.
54. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(2) (1953) (“The Court of Chancery, upon application of any stockholder, may appoint 1 or more persons to be custodians . . . of and for any corporation when . . . [t]he business of the corporation is suffering or is threatened with irreparable injury because the directors are so divided respecting the management of the affairs of the corporation
that the required vote for action by the board of directors cannot be obtained and the stockholders
are unable to terminate this division . . . .”); see also discussion infra Part III.A.2.
55. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *57.
56. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (1953) (“If there be a failure to hold the annual
meeting [of stockholders] . . . the Court of Chancery may summarily order a meeting to be held
upon the application of any stockholder or director.”).
57. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *73.
58. The parties are defined as Elting, Shawe, and Ms. Shawe, who was firmly aligned with
her son. Id. at *2, *73–74.
59. Id. at *73.
60. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(1) (1953) (“The Court of Chancery, upon application of any stockholder, may appoint 1 or more persons to be custodians . . . of and for any corporation when[, a]t any meeting held for the election of directors the stockholders are so divided that
they have failed to elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired
upon qualification of their successors . . . .”); see also discussion infra Part III.A.1.
61. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *74–75.
62. Id. at *79.
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given until June 30, 2015 to resolve their differences under the mediator’s
supervision,63 but were unable to reach an agreement by that date.64
D. The Court of Chancery’s Reasoning and Holding
The Court of Chancery ultimately held that the appointment of a custodian to oversee a judicially ordered sale of the Company was warranted
both under Sections 226(a)(1) and 226(a)(2).65
The Court of Chancery observed that the requirements of 226(a)(1)—a
provision which does not require a showing of irreparable injury—were
plainly met.66 The court reasoned that, since the stockholders of TransPerfect expressly stipulated to deadlock and an inability to elect successor directors,67 the 226(a)(1) mandate was satisfied.68 Though the fulfillment of
the 226(a)(1) mandate is enough to authorize the court to exercise its discretion and appoint a custodian, Chancellor Bouchard continued his inquiry
under 226(a)(2).69 He observed that Section 226(a)(2) carries three conditions that must be satisfied before the Court of Chancery may exercise its
authority under the statute.70 First, the directors must be deadlocked.71
Second, the corporation’s business must either be suffering or be threatened
with irreparable injury because of the deadlock.72 Third, the “circumstances
must be such that the shareholders are unable by shareholder vote to terminate the division between the directors.”73 The Court of Chancery ultimately held (1) that Shawe and Elting were “deadlocked on several matters of
critical importance to the Company” including tax and non-tax distributions
and the hiring and retention of various employees;74 (2) that irreparable in-

63. Id. at *79–80.
64. Id. at *80.
65. Id. at *105. The Court of Chancery also held (1) the equitable dissolution of the Company was inappropriate in the circumstances before the court, (2) that Elting was entitled to favorable judgment with respect to each of the claims Shawe asserted against her, and (3) that the LLC
founded by Shawe and Elting should be dissolved. Id. at *114–15, *126, *133. Considering the
issues on appeal, this Note will not address these holdings.
66. Id. at *82.
67. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
68. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *82–83.
69. Id. at *83.
70. Id. at *83–84 (citing Hoban v. Dardanella Elec. Corp., No. 7615, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS
599, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. June 12, 1984)).
71. Id. The board of directors must be “so divided respecting the management of the affairs
of the corporation that the vote required for curative action by the board as a governing body cannot be obtained.” Id. at *83–84 (quoting Hoban, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *2).
72. Id. at *84 (quoting Hoban, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *2–3).
73. Id. (quoting Hoban, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *2).
74. Id. at *84, *89, *89 n.285.
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jury75 to a corporation has been found to include “harm to a corporation’s
reputation, goodwill, customer relationships, and employee morale”76 and
that it had occurred to the Company in the form of severely diminished employee morale, client skepticism, and failure to potentially benefit from
proposed acquisitions;77 and (3) that the stipulation entered into by the
stockholders “plainly” demonstrated that they were unable to overcome director deadlock.78 Thus, all three requirements of 226(a)(2) were met.
As the court observed, “Even when the requirements of Sections
226(a)(1) or 226(a)(2) have been satisfied, the appointment of a custodian is
not mandatory, but is committed to the Court’s discretion.”79 Thus, the
court was faced with the question of whether the circumstances before it
truly warranted an exercise of its authority under Section 226(a).80 In answering this question, the court weighed three options.81 The court first rejected the option to “decline to appoint a custodian and leave the parties to
their own devices,” since (1) dysfunctional management was causing the
Company to suffer and threatened it with irreparable harm, and (2) “to leave
Elting with no recourse except to sell her 50% interest in the Company”
would not enable her to sell her stake at a fair price, since no “rational person would want to step into Elting’s shoes to partner with someone willing
to ‘cause constant pain’ and ‘go the distance’ to get his way.”82 The court
then rejected the option to appoint a custodian as a third director in a tiebreaking role, observing that the court would be “enmesh[ed] . . . into matters of internal corporate governance for an extensive period of time.”83
The final option, which the court ultimately adopted, was to appoint a custodian to sell the company to a third party.84 The court cited two prior instances when the Court of Chancery “appointed custodians to resolve deadlocks involving profitable corporations and authorized them to conduct a

75. See id. at *92–93 (“Irreparable injury exists ‘when a later money damage award would
involve speculation’ . . . .” (quoting Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1090 (Del. Ch.
2004), aff’d, 872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005))).
76. Id. at *93 (citing Kirpat, Inc. v. Del. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 741 A.2d 356, 358
(Del. 1998); Arkema Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 5479-VCP, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 120, at *4
(Del. Ch. May 25, 2010); Penn Mart Supermarkets, Inc. v. New Castle Shopping LLC, No. 20405NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2005); Shah v. Shah, No. 904(k), 1986
Del. Ch. LEXIS 467, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 1986)).
77. Id. at *96–98.
78. Id. at *98.
79. Id. at *99.
80. Id.
81. See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
82. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *101–02.
83. Id. at *102.
84. Id. at *102–03.
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sale of the corporation.”85 The court reasoned that, though the remedy was
“unusual” and “should be implemented only as a last resort and with extreme caution,” it was appropriate to opt for a custodial sale in this circumstance, since “[Shawe and Elting’s] dysfunction must be excised to safeguard the Company.”86 Shawe and his mother filed an interlocutory appeal,
asking the Delaware Supreme Court to reverse and to consider “less drastic
measures.”87
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
As a general matter, Section 226(a) of the DGCL allows the Court of
Chancery to appoint a custodian in any one of three scenarios: stockholder
deadlock,88 director deadlock,89 or the abandonment of corporate business.90
This Part will first lay out the threshold requirements of Sections 226(a)(1)
and 226(a)(2), both of which Elting used as grounds for relief.91 It will then
explain the discretionary nature of a custodial appointment under Section
226(b), and will demonstrate the level of authority the Court of Chancery
has previously vested in Section 226 custodians.92
A. The Threshold Requirements of Sections 226(a)(1) and 226(a)(2)
1. Section 226(a)(1): The Stockholder Deadlock Scenario
Section 226(a)(1) provides that the Court of Chancery may appoint a
custodian when, “[a]t any meeting held for the election of directors[,] the
stockholders are so divided that they have failed to elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon qualification of
their successors.”93 Unlike Section 226(a)(2), Section 226(a)(1) does not
require a showing of actual or threatened irreparable corporate harm.94 Sec-

85. Id. at *102 (citing Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 73 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2000); Fulk v.
Wash. Serv. Assocs., No. 17747-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002)).
86. Id. at *102–103.
87. Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 154–55 (Del. 2017).
88. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
89. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
90. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(3) (1953) (providing that the Court of Chancery may
appoint a custodian when “[t]he corporation has abandoned its business and has failed within a
reasonable time to take steps to dissolve, liquidate, or distribute its assets”). For purposes of this
Note, the requirements and applications of Section 226(a)(3) will not be addressed, since the petitioner in Shawe v. Elting made no claim for relief thereunder.
91. See discussion infra Part II.A.
92. See discussion infra Part II.B.
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(1) (1953).
94. See Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 238 (Del. 1982) (“Specifically, § 226(a)(1)
requires no additional showing such as irreparable harm to the stockholder or the corporation.”).
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tion 226(a)(1) requires only a demonstration of a stockholder division resulting in failure to elect successor directors—it contains “no other condition or exception, expressed or implied.”95 Thus, a Section 226 custodial
appointment is more easily pursued under 226(a)(1), since a claim thereunder is subject to fewer statutory prerequisites.96
2. Section 226(a)(2): The Director Deadlock Scenario
Section 226(a)(2) provides that the Court of Chancery may appoint a
custodian when directors have reached a decision-making impasse that
threatens the business of the corporation with irreparable injury and when
such an impasse is incurable by way of shareholder vote.97 This subsection
has three distinct requirements: (1) “the business of the corporation must
either be suffering or be threatened with irreparable injury,” (2) “the cause
of the business malady must stem directly from the fact that the directors
are so divided respecting the management of the corporation’s affairs that
the vote required for curative action by the board as a governing body cannot be obtained,” and (3) “circumstances must be such that the shareholders
are unable by shareholder vote to terminate the division between the directors.”98
Delaware’s Section 226 jurisprudence indicates that irreparable harm
exists where the corporation in question is threatened with insolvency or
loss of revenue.99 In Hoban v. Dardanella Electric Corp.,100 the Court of
Chancery found that irreparable harm existed where director deadlock was
such that it prevented a change in the corporation’s bank which would: (1)
extend the company’s line of credit by $1.1 million, (2) reduce its interest
expense by $100,000, and (3) prevent the company from “go[ing] under.”101
Similarly, in Kleinberg v. Aharon,102 the Court of Chancery found that a
corporation suffered irreparable harm where its directors’ deadlock de95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, No. 2140-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *10–12 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 10, 2009) (finding that the claimant was unable to offer proof sufficient to support a finding
of threatened or present irreparable harm under 226(a)(2) but was able to “clearly demonstrate[]
that the limited statutory prerequisite” of 226(a)(1) had been satisfied); see also Bentas v.
Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 73 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2000) (granting custodial relief under 226(a)(1) but noting that the stockholder division before the court had not affected the economic well-being of the
still solvent and profitable company).
97. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(2) (1953).
98. Hoban v. Dardanella Elec. Corp., No. 7615, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *2–3 (Del. Ch.
June 12, 1984); see also Kleinberg v. Aharon, No. 12719-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *32–
33 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2017) (listing Section 226(a)(2)’s requirements as laid out in Hoban).
99. See infra notes 100–109 and accompanying text.
100. No. 7615, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599 (Del. Ch. June 12, 1984).
101. Id. at *4–7.
102. No. 12719-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2017).
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prived it of the opportunity to benefit from a business venture with another
company that credibly seemed to be its “only hope” and caused its only remaining commercial relationship to disintegrate.103 The court noted that,
unless the deadlock came to an end, “the [c]ompany ha[d] no chance of pursuing a new business plan and w[ould] become irretrievably insolvent.”104
Conversely, mere inconvenience to the company and its affairs is insufficient to establish irreparable harm.105 In Miller v. Miller,106 the Court
of Chancery found that the purported deadlock between the sibling-owners
of two separate youth camps operating as one company amounted to nothing but an inconvenience, because the business was still profitable and still
operated “reasonably well.”107 The separate camps served as separate profit
centers for each of the brothers allowing for a reasonable division of income
between them, and camp managers were able to navigate logistical problems such that the daily and efficient operation of the camps remained unaffected.108 In emphasizing the profitability of the camps, the court held that
no irreparable harm existed.109
The second and third elements of 226(a)(2)—“that the directors must
be, in fact, deadlocked”110 and that the shareholders “must be ‘unable to
vote to terminate’” such deadlock by way of shareholder vote’”111—usually
go hand-in-hand and are present most commonly in the context of closely
held private corporations.112 For example, the dispute in Hoban involved a
company with two equally situated shareholders, Hoban and Rensberger,
who doubled as the company’s only two directors.113 When Hoban proposed a purportedly essential bank transition,114 Rensberger refused to give
his approval unless Hoban, inter alia, resigned as CEO, thus creating an
impasse.115 Because of the dual nature of their roles, the director deadlock

103. Id. at *17–18, *24–26, *35, *37.
104. Id. at *39.
105. See infra notes 106–109 and accompanying text.
106. No. 2140-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2009).
107. Id. at *9.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *9–10.
110. Kleinberg v. Aharon, No. 12719-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *32 (Del. Ch. Feb.
13, 2017) (citing In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No.
10449-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *26 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Shawe v.
Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017)).
111. Id. at *32–33 (quoting Hoban v. Dardanella Elec. Corp., No. 7615, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS
599, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 12, 1984)).
112. See infra notes 113–121 and accompanying text.
113. Hoban v. Dardanella Elec. Corp., No. 7615, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *3 (Del. Ch.
June 12, 1984).
114. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
115. Hoban, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *5–6.
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was incurable by way of a shareholder vote,116 and—having found a threat
of irreparable harm to be present117—the court appointed a custodian under
226(a)(2).118 Similarly, the company involved in Miller was owned and
managed by two brothers, each holding fifty percent of its stock.119 Due to
mounting tensions and a failure to elect directors for more than five years,
the two siblings were held over as the company’s only two directors,
“thereby preserving an even split . . . consistent with the equal ownership
interests.”120 The deadlock in Miller, therefore, could not have been cured
by shareholder vote.121
Importantly, Section 226(a) provides that the Court of Chancery “may
appoint” a custodian where its statutory prerequisites are met.122 This language has been interpreted as conferring broad judicial discretion—thus,
even where 226(a) has been satisfied, the court is not compelled to provide
the custodianship remedy.123 Delaware courts have traditionally demonstrated reluctance in ordering the “intrusive” custodianship remedy,124 since
“such relief constitutes a radical step that ought not to be granted unless the
plaintiff has rather plainly shown his entitlement to it.”125

116. See id. at *7 (“Since the two directors are each a 50 per cent shareholder of the corporation, it follows that the division of the board which threatens irreparable injury to [the company]
cannot be cured by action of the shareholders.”).
117. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
118. Hoban, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *7.
119. Miller v. Miller, No. 2140-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10,
2009).
120. Id. at *7.
121. Id. Despite the presence of director deadlock, the court in Miller observed that the corporation was not threatened with irreparable harm as required by 226(a)(2). Id. at *9. Thus, the
court granted custodial relief under Section 226(a)(1), since there was “an undisputed showing of
utter disagreement between the two 50% stockholder factions on a number of serious issues.” Id.
at *11–12.
122. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a) (1953) (emphasis added).
123. See Miller, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *13 n.15 (“Significantly, the Court ‘may’ appoint
a custodian if the conditions of 8 Del. C. § 226 are satisfied; it is not mandatory.”); see also
Kleinberg v. Aharon, No. 12719-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *33 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2017)
(“The decision to appoint a custodian is a matter of the court’s discretion.” (quoting 1 EDWARD P.
WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 226.01, at 7-308 (6th
ed 2015))).
124. See Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 77 (Del. Ch. 2000) (explaining defendants’ argument that “the intrusive custodianship remedy ought not to be granted, especially for an economically successful corporation . . . , unless the record clearly shows that it is necessary and there is
no better alternative”).
125. Giancarlo v. OG Corp., No. 10669, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. June 23,
1989); see, e.g., Bentas v. Haseotes, No. 17223, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, at *15–17 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 5, 1999) (declining to appoint a custodian in the first instance and instead ordering a shareholders’ meeting which, in the court’s opinion, had the potential to end the shareholder deadlock
in dispute).
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B. A Discretionary Exercise: The Scope of Custodial Authority
Previously Granted by the Court of Chancery Under Section 226(b)
Section 226(b) vests the Court of Chancery with considerable authority in fashioning the powers of an appointed custodian.126 Still, once the
custodianship remedy has been ordered, “[t]he involvement of the Court of
Chancery and its custodian in the corporation’s business and affairs should
be kept to a minimum and should be exercised only insofar as the goals of
fairness and justice . . . require.”127 As the court in Bentas v. Haseotes128
opined, the risk that the custodianship remedy would be unnecessarily intrusive vis-à-vis the board’s management of the corporation is mitigated by
specifically defining the custodian’s role and the parameters of his or her
authority.129 A custodian’s authority “should be tailored as narrowly as
possible because judicially-supervised interference with the ordinary operation of a corporation should be kept to a minimum.”130
In Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp.,131 when the plaintiffs’ petition for the
appointment of a custodian was originally denied by the Court of Chancery,
the Delaware Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to appoint
a custodian vested with “sharply limited” powers.132 The impartial133 custodian was to be given the authority to act only when “the board of directors . . . failed to reach a unanimous decision on any issue properly before
them.”134 The custodian’s “tie-breaker” decision in these instances would
be binding on the corporation and its agents.135 It was left to the Court of
Chancery to determine how long the custodian would preside, unless or until all of the company’s shareholders unanimously requested the custodian’s
discharge.136
Further, in Miller, the Court of Chancery appointed a custodian for a
two-year term with limited authority.137 The custodian was vested with the
power:
126. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(b) (1953) (defining the scope of the appointed custodian’s authority “except when the Court shall otherwise order” (emphasis added)).
127. Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982).
128. 769 A.2d 70 (Del. Ch. 2000).
129. Id. at 78.
130. Miller v. Miller, No. 2140-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *14 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10,
2009).
131. 449 A.2d 232 (Del. 1982).
132. Id. at 240.
133. See id. at 240 n.15 (stating that the custodian should not be a stockholder or creditor of
the corporation or of any of its subsidiaries or affiliates).
134. Id. at 240.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Miller v. Miller, No. 2140-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *18–19 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10,
2009).
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(1) to break material deadlocks between directors; (2) to resolve
operational deadlocks between the two camps; (3) to participate
with the power of a director in the event one of the directors is
unable to serve, with such action duly to reflect the interest of the
director for whom the custodian is substituting; and (4) to seek to
resolve the impasse over the future of the Company.138
The custodian would serve a “tie-breaking” role similar to that of the
custodian in Giuricich,139 with additional mediation powers—however, “no
authority [was] conferred upon the custodian[] to sell or divide the Company’s real property.”140 Despite its holding, the Court of Chancery nonetheless invited counsel on both sides to confer and to jointly propose different
scopes of custodial authority for its consideration and to suggest an individual to serve as the company’s custodian.141
Even in Bentas, where the Court of Chancery vested rather broad power in the custodian to “explore any and all alternatives that might result in a
mutually agreed solution to the current shareholder deadlock,”142 it expressly declined to prescribe the method through which the custodian would seek
to end the deadlock.143 The court agreed with the plaintiffs that to do so
would be “premature and could truncate the parties’ ability to explore additional solutions that may lead to an agreed resolution of their differences.”144 In its reasoning, the court refused to consider the defendants’
proposal that the custodian “be directed and empowered to sell the Company to a third party.”145 Additionally, while the custodian would have the authority to cast a tie-breaking vote, the custodian would only be able to do so
“in disputes that the custodian deem[ed] to be significant to managing the
corporation’s business and affairs”—not on every issue with regard to
which the board is equally divided.146
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Shawe v. Elting,147 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s order, holding that the court’s decision to appoint

138. Id.
139. See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text.
140. Miller, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *19 n.21.
141. Id. at *19. This joint proposal would be submitted by counsel as “a form of order to implement [the court’s] letter opinion.” Id.
142. Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 80 (Del. Ch. 2000).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 79.
146. Id.
147. 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017).
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a custodian to sell the Company was statutorily permissible and was not an
abuse of discretion, since the court reasonably concluded that other less intrusive measures to resolve director deadlock would be ineffective.148 On
appeal, Shawe made three arguments: (1) that the court exceeded its statutory authority under Section 226 when it ordered the custodian to sell a solvent company;149 (2) that, even if the statutory authority existed to empower
the custodian to sell the Company, the court should have pursued other
means to address the deadlock before resorting to a sale;150 and (3) that the
United States and Delaware Constitutions do not authorize the court to order the custodian to sell the Company over stockholders’ objections.151 In a
split en banc decision, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected all three of
these arguments.152 Dissenting from the majority decision of her four colleagues, Justice Valihura argued that the sale of the Company absent stockholder consent was too drastic a measure in light of applicable case law,
stockholder property rights, and due process protections.153
On appeal, Shawe did not contest the Court of Chancery’s ruling that
the requirements of Section 226(a)(1) were met154—instead, he challenged
the appointment of a custodian under Section 226(a)(2), claiming that the
court incorrectly applied the standard for irreparable injury.155 The court
labeled this argument “academic,” since the custodial appointment was
statutorily warranted under 226(a)(1) regardless.156 Still, the court observed
that the Court of Chancery correctly applied the threatened or actual irreparable injury requirement of 226(a)(2).157 It reasoned that, were deadlock to
persist, “the Company was likely to continue on the path of plummeting
employee morale, key employee departures, customer uncertainty, damage
to the Company’s public reputation and goodwill, and fundamental inability
to grow the Company through acquisitions.”158

148. Id. at 160, 166–67.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 162.
151. Id at 168. The court dismissed this constitutional argument and refused to consider it on
the merits, since it was raised for the first time on appeal and was not “fairly presented to the trial
court.” Id. (citing DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 8). This Note will not address the constitutional argument.
152. Id. at 162–63, 166, 169.
153. Id. at 169–88 (Valihura, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 161 (majority opinion); see id. (explaining that Shawe could not have challenged
the Court of Chancery’s ruling with respect to 226(a)(1), since Shawe and Elting “stipulated to the
stockholder deadlock required by the statute”).
155. Id.
156. See id. (“[T]he argument is academic because Shawe agreed that the Court of Chancery
was authorized to appoint a custodian under § 226(a)(1).”).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 162.
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Shawe also argued that the Court of Chancery abused its discretion in
that it did not sufficiently consider less intrusive measures before it appointed a custodian to sell the Company.159 The Delaware Supreme Court
rejected this argument based on its observation that the Court of Chancery
made two attempts at developing a remedy less extreme than a company
sale: (1) it appointed a custodian immediately post-trial to mediate the dispute between Shawe and Elting, which failed to resolve the deadlock,160 and
(2) it weighed the option of appointing a custodian as a third director who
would serve as a “tie-breaker,” and then reasonably rejected it on the
grounds that the court would have to “exercise essentially perpetual oversight over the internal affairs of the Company,” something it was not willing to undertake.161 The Delaware Supreme Court ultimately observed that
“[t]he Chancellor was in the best position to assess the viability of options
short of sale.”162 Further, the court pointed to several cases “confirm[ing]
the Court of Chancery’s broad authority under the statute, which includes
ordering a sale.”163
In her dissent, Justice Valihura pointed to two main principles undermining the majority’s decision.164 First, the DGCL treats stock as personal
property, which is “generally subject to traditional property law policies favoring free alienation.”165 In her analysis of the DGCL statutory scheme,
Justice Valihura concluded that stockholders’ personal property rights are
not meant to be abridged by mere implication—rather, where the DGCL restricts the free transferability or alienability of stock, “it does so expressly.”166 Because Section 226 fails to provide express fair notice to stock159. Id. at 166.
160. Id. at 166–67.
161. Id at 167 (quoting In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700CB, No. 10449-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *102 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d sub nom.
Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017)); see id. (“[T]he appointment of a custodian to act as a
constant monitor and tie-breaker . . . would itself be expensive, cumbersome, and very intrusive.”).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 163 & n.36 (citing Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 73 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2000); Bentas
v. Haseotes, No. 17223, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2003); Fulk v. Wash. Serv.
Assocs., No. 17747-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 78 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002); In re Supreme Oil
Co., Inc., No. 10618-VCL, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 319 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015); Brown v. Rosenberg, No. 833, 1981 Del. Ch. LEXIS 629 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1981)).
164. Id. at 170–71 (Valihura, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 170.
166. Id. at 173. Justice Valihura cites several examples, including Section 251 (providing notice to stockholders objecting to a merger that their shares may be subject to divestiture upon merger majority approval), Section 273 (providing notice to fifty-fifty shareholders that in the presence of threshold circumstances, their venture may be dissolved despite one shareholder’s
objection), and Section 303 (allowing a corporation filing for bankruptcy to, inter alia, “make any
change in its . . . capital stock” or “be dissolved”). Id. at 173–75 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 251 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 303 (1953)).
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holders that they may be subject to giving up their shares over their objection, it is unlikely that the Delaware General Assembly intended to permit
the Court of Chancery to order the whole sale of a company to a third party,
despite the absence of unanimous shareholder consent.167 The second principle proffered by Justice Valihura was that “the involvement of the Court
of Chancery and court-appointed custodians in a corporation’s business and
affairs should be kept to a minimum.”168 She explained that the Court of
Chancery’s past decisions illustrate the concept that the court should intrude
as little as possible into the business of the corporation.169 She further reasoned that stockholder consent to a court-issued remedy is of critical importance—it “softens the blow,” so to speak, and affects the extent to which
a remedy intrudes upon a corporation’s affairs.170 Absent stockholder consent, there is more intrusion.171 Justice Valihura finally concluded that “the
sale of the Company, absent stockholder consent, is too drastic a measure,
and . . . the trial court should [have] consider[ed the] implementation of
remedies on an incremental basis.”172
IV. ANALYSIS
In affirming the Court of Chancery’s decision, the Delaware Supreme
Court erred in two ways. First, the court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s
incorrect reasoning with respect to the “irreparable harm” requirement of
Section 226(a)(2).173 It ignored longstanding jurisprudence requiring a
demonstration of imminent insolvency or loss of revenue, and instead accepted the Court of Chancery’s expansive proposition that irreparable harm
may be deemed to encompass severely diminished employee morale, client
skepticism, and failure to benefit from proposed acquisitions.174 Second,
the court improperly affirmed the Court of Chancery’s massive grant of
custodial authority in that it did not consider less intrusive alternatives and
ordered a sale despite shareholder objections—an unprecedented judicial
act.175 The court summarily accepted a custodial sale as the only means of
appropriate relief, without considering that its equitable power—though
significantly broad—may have some limit.176

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 173.
Id. at 171 (citing Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982)).
Id. at 183.
Id. at 184.
Id.
Id. at 186.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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A. The Delaware Supreme Court Trivialized the Irreparable Harm
Requirement of Section 226(a)(2)
Though Shawe and Elting stipulated to deadlock and satisfied the requirements of Section 226(a)(1), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
Court of Chancery’s incorrect reasoning with respect to a custodial appointment under 226(a)(2) in dicta.177 In doing so, it interpreted the irreparable harm requirement so as to encompass severely diminished employee
morale, client skepticism, and failure to benefit from proposed acquisitions—notwithstanding the Company’s profitability to date.178 The court
noted that, were the deadlock to persist, “the Company was likely to continue on the path of plummeting employee morale, key employee departures, customer uncertainty, damage to Company’s public reputation and
goodwill, and fundamental inability to grow the Company through acquisitions.”179 This, it held, was sufficient to demonstrate threatened and actual
irreparable harm to the Company.180 Section 226 jurisprudence and general
principles of irreparable harm, however, suggest that this conclusion was
flawed.
The irreparable harm requirement should not be satisfied when the
corporation is in no way threatened with insolvency or loss of revenue.181
In Kleinberg, for example, the Court of Chancery found the existence of
threatened irreparable harm and noted that, unless the deadlock at issue
came to an end, the company would “ha[ve] no chance of pursuing a new
business plan and [would] become irretrievably insolvent.”182 Similarly, in
Hoban, where deadlock amongst directors blocked a purportedly essential
bank transition without which the company would “go under,” the court
found that irreparable harm existed, since “[s]ome change in financing arrangements [was] needed promptly if [the company was] to continue in
business.”183 Conversely, in Miller, the court found that where “[t]he business of the corporation . . . [still] operate[d] reasonably well,” irreparable

177. Shawe,157 A.3d at 162 (majority opinion).
178. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB,
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *96–98 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Shawe v. Elting,
157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017).
179. Shawe, 157 A.3d at 162.
180. Id.
181. See infra notes 182–184 and accompanying text.
182. Kleinberg v. Aharon, No. 12719-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *39 (Del. Ch. Feb.
13, 2017).
183. Hoban v. Dardanella Elec. Corp., No. 7615, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 599, at *5–6 (Del. Ch.
June 12, 1984).
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harm was not demonstrated—in holding as it did, the court emphasized the
profitability of the business.184
In support of its conclusion that irreparable corporate harm may include “harm to a corporation’s reputation, goodwill, customer relationships,
and employee morale,” the Court of Chancery cited four cases185—all of
which were insufficiently explained or were readily distinguishable from
the facts of In re Shawe & Elting LLC. The first of the cases, Kirpat, Inc. v.
Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission,186 was cited in a parenthetical as “finding irreparable harm where the company would suffer ‘loss
of its customer base, and loss of its employees.’”187 The company in Kirpat, however, would additionally “suffer the seizure of its inventory” and
would consequently “lose its business” were the court to deny a stay pending appeal with respect to the revocation of the corporation’s liquor license.188 Thus, the loss of the Kirpat corporation’s customer base and employees was less significant, as the seizure of the corporation’s assets
threatened insolvency and loss of revenue. The Court of Chancery failed to
address this aspect of Kirpat and, instead, suggested that a failure to retain
customers and employees, notwithstanding its effect on the company’s
profitability, is sufficient to establish irreparable harm.
The Court of Chancery then cited Arkema, Inc. v. Dow Chemical
Co.189 as “finding irreparable harm where an imminent threat to the company’s goodwill and reputation existed.”190 This parenthetical, too, is lacking
in holistic factual background. In Arkema, the corporation’s business—the
manufacture and sale of products containing a key chemical supplied by the
defendant191—heavily depended on the company’s reputation for reliabil184. Miller v. Miller, No. 2140-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 16, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10,
2009).
185. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB,
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93 n.298 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Shawe v. Elting,
157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017) (citing Kirpat, Inc. v. Del. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 741 A.2d 356,
358 (Del. 1998); Arkema Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 5479-VCP, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 120, at
*4 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010); Penn Mart Supermarkets, Inc. v. New Castle Shopping LLC, No.
20405-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2005); Shah v. Shah, No. 904(k),
1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 467, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 1986)); see supra note 76. The Court of
Chancery provided these four cases, and these four cases only, as support for its above the line
proposition that irreparable corporate harm may include “harm to a corporation’s reputation,
goodwill, customer relationships, and employee morale.” In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93.
186. 741 A.2d 356 (Del. 1998).
187. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93 n.298 (citing Kirpat, 741
A.2d at 358).
188. Kirpat, 741 A.2d at 358.
189. No. 5479-VCP, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 120 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010).
190. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93 n.298 (citing Arkema, 2010
Del. Ch. LEXIS 120, at *4).
191. Arkema, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 120, at *1.
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ity.192 This was so because the company’s customers maintained quality
control programs requiring them to “evaluate the reliability of their suppliers’ supply chain.”193 To that end, the company was required to “compete
continually to gain and retain its customers” and expressly marketed itself
as more reliable than its competitors.194 In the Arkema plaintiff’s business,
“reliability is essential when determining whether or not to choose a supplier,” and harm to the company’s reputation would directly result in the loss
of “significant amounts of its business.”195 In fact, Arkema submitted several affidavits to show, inter alia, that the defendant’s failure to supply the
plaintiff with the chemical essential to its products would “cause Arkema to
lose customers and business for an indefinite period going forward.”196
Thus, contrary to the Court of Chancery’s analysis in In re Shawe & Elting,
the Arkema decision does not stand for the proposition that damage to a
company’s reputation, without more, is sufficient to establish actual or
threatened irreparable harm. The direct correlation between the company’s
reputation for reliability and the profitability of its business was of critical
importance in the Arkema court’s ultimate finding of threatened irreparable
harm.
The third case cited by the Court of Chancery was Penn Mart Supermarkets, Inc. v. New Castle Shopping LLC,197 which was described as “finding potential lost sales and lost customers sufficient to establish irreparable
harm.”198 Penn Mart involved two lessees in a shopping center—one operating a supermarket (“Thriftway”) and the other operating a discount store
(“NWL”).199 The dispute arose from NWL’s alleged violation of a lease
covenant precluding it from selling certain perishable products and protecting Thriftway from competition.200 The court found that the threat of irreparable harm existed where NWL’s violation caused Thriftway to suffer “potential lost sales” and “loss of customers,” thus entitling Thriftway to
limited permanent injunctive relief.201 The finding of irreparable harm in
Penn Mart is completely consistent with the long-standing principle that irreparable harm can only be said to exist where loss of revenue or a decrease
in profitability is imminent. It fails, however, to illustrate the Court of
192. Id. at *16.
193. Id.
194. Id. at *15–16.
195. Id. at *9, *17.
196. Id. at *16 (quoting Douglas Sharp Aff. p.54).
197. No. 20405-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2005).
198. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93 n.298 (citing Penn Mart,
2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *15).
199. 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *1.
200. Id. at *1, *4.
201. Id. at *69, *71.
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Chancery’s generalized above-the-line proposition that irreparable harm
may include “harm to a corporation’s reputation, goodwill, customer relationships, and employee morale.”202 At no point in Penn Mart does the
court make such a determination.
The Court of Chancery finally cited Shah v. Shah203 as “finding irreparable harm when disruptive management conflicts threatened employee retention.”204 In Shah, one of the part-owners of a local motel was accused of
harassing the business’s employees and interfering with the performance of
their duties.205 Entered into evidence were the affidavits of several employees expressing their intent to resign if the disruptive and “harassing” behavior of the part-owner towards them was not restrained.206 Were the aggrieved employees to indeed resign, the court in Shah observed that “the
[partnership’s] operations [would] be severely impaired and may cease entirely,” likely due to the motel’s status as a small, service-oriented business.207 The Court of Chancery in In re Shawe & Elting again failed to
mention that the record in Shah indicated that that irreparable harm in the
form of a complete business shutdown was imminent, absent court intervention. Thus, the partnership in Shah was indeed threatened with insolvency—mere lack of employee retention, without more, would have been unlikely to persuade the Shah court that the motel was threatened with
irreparable harm.
The Delaware Supreme Court summarily and incorrectly affirmed the
Court of Chancery’s reasoning with respect to the irreparable harm requirement of Section 226(a)(2) without examining the sources cited in support of the Court of Chancery’s expansive proposition. It concluded that
“the Court of Chancery properly applied . . . settled principles of irreparable
injury to evaluate the likelihood of threatened or actual irreparable injury to
the Company’s business.”208 This conclusion is flawed, since “settled principles of irreparable injury” have not traditionally been said to rest solely on
diminished employee morale, client skepticism, and failure to benefit from
proposed acquisitions notwithstanding the Company’s profitability to
date.209

202. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93.
203. No. 904(k), 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 467 (Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 1986).
204. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93 n.298 (citing Shah, 1986
Del. Ch. LEXIS 467, at *2).
205. Shah, 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 467, at *1.
206. Id. at *2, *6–7.
207. Id. at *7.
208. Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 161–62 (Del. 2017).
209. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *96–98.
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TransPerfect is a global behemoth that nets millions of dollars in annual income.210 Tensions between Shawe and Elting peaked in 2012, but
the Company’s revenue two years later in 2014 exceeded an all-time high of
$470 million.211 Nothing in the record suggests that the Shawe and Elting
feud jeopardized the Company’s immense profitability, which was recognized expressly by Chancellor Bouchard in his opinion.212 Despite the incessant corporate in-fighting, the Company “experienced profitable growth
every year for over two decades.”213 In fact, after the Court of Chancery’s
decision issued, it was reported that the Company’s revenue totaled $546
million in 2016—an “all-time record.”214 The Company had no debt.215
Still, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that TransPerfect was threatened with irreparable harm in the form of “harm to [its] reputation, goodwill, customer relationships, and employee morale.”216 In doing so, the
court missed a significant nuance: the harms it describes are but the means
by which irreparable corporate harm, as a separate and isolated consequence, ultimately manifests itself. Harms to a company’s reputation,
goodwill, customer relationships, and employee morale are certainly harms
that could theoretically have an impact on the company’s solvency or profitability; however, absent a grand scheme showing of an imminent and direct impact, they are insufficient of their own right to be deemed irreparable
in nature. Incidental, typical, and expected harms that flow from corporate
dissension should not be deemed sufficient to constitute irreparable harm,
absent a demonstration of imminent insolvency or loss of revenue. The
court’s contrary conclusion—though made in dictum—sets a dangerous
precedent and relaxes the threshold irreparable harm requirement, making it
significantly easier to meet. In fact, Vice Chancellor Laster recently cited
to this dictum in a subsequent decision, suggesting that the In re Shawe &
Elting LLC court’s proposition has become the new standard of analysis in
the irreparable harm context.217 Instead of exhausting intra-corporate reme210. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
212. See In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *91 (“It is true the Company has been highly profitable.”).
213. Id. at *10 (emphasis added); see id. at *10 tbl.1 (charting the increase in the Company’s
profitability from 2008 when the Company’s revenue totaled $199.1 million, to 2014 when the
Company’s revenue totaled $471.3 million).
214. TransPerfect Annual Sales Reach All-Time High in 2016, NASDAQ GLOBAL NEWSWIRE
(Jan. 17, 2017), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/01/17/906384/0/en/TransPerfectAnnual-Sales-Reach-All-Time-High-in-2016.html.
215. Id.
216. Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 161 (Del. 2017) (citing In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015
Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93).
217. Kleinberg v. Aharon, No.12719-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *37 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27,
2017) (quoting In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No.
10449-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015)) (“The necessary harm also can
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dies and attempting in good faith to resolve conflict outside the courtroom,
it is likely directors looking to walk away from the business will petition the
court for a more readily attainable custodianship remedy under Section
226(a)(2), using incidental effects of corporate dysfunction as the basis for
their claim to irreparable harm.
Interestingly, the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court
both chose to entertain the 226(a)(2) argument even though custodianship
was appropriate regardless under Section 226(a)(1).218 Why would these
courts—arguably the most sophisticated corporate tribunals in the country219—purposefully spend time discussing and validating an argument that
was nonessential to the outcome of the case? The answer is simple: proportionality. The phrase “irreparable harm” carries massive weight in corporate jurisprudence. It appears in a multitude of equitable contexts, including
that of the preliminary injunction,220 that of the temporary restraining order,221 and that of receivership.222 In these circumstances, “irreparable
harm” is pervasive legal language that signals a potential for injury so
grievous that immediate equitable court intervention is required as a matter
of justice.223 The Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court seem
to have intentionally framed the Shawe-Elting feud as a legally cognizable
instance of irreparable harm so that a drastic equitable remedy would seem
more justified. The courts deliberately weaved the “theme” of irreparable
result from damage to ‘a corporation’s reputation, goodwill, customer relationships, and employee
morale.’”). Ultimately, as discussed supra in Part IV.A of this Note, the court in Kleinberg expressly found that insolvency was indeed imminent—it thus applied the correct irreparable harm
standard to the facts before it, despite having cited the dictum in In re Shawe & Elting LLC. See
supra note 182 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 69, 156 and accompanying text.
219. See Alana Semuels, The Tiny State Whose Laws Affect Workers Everywhere, ATLANTIC
(Oct.
3,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/corporategovernance/502487/ (“[The Delaware Court of Chancery’s] judges are some of the country’s most
renowned experts in business law.”).
220. See, e.g., In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 497 (Del. Ch. 2010) (explaining
that a preliminary injunction may only be granted if plaintiffs demonstrate that they would suffer
irreparable injury absent relief).
221. See DEL. CH. R. 65(b) (“A temporary restraining order may be granted . . . only if . . . it
clearly appears from specific facts . . . that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will
result to the applicant . . . .”).
222. See, e.g., Beal Bank v. Lucks, No. 14896, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 203, at *13 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 23, 1998) (explaining that the discretionary nature of the receivership remedy requires a consideration of the imminence of irreparable loss).
223. See DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, CORPORATE & COMMERCIAL
PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 2.03 (2017) (explaining that “equitable
jurisdiction may be invoked . . . only if the threat of the injury . . . is shown to be a real and continuing one”); see also Chateau Apartments Co. v. Wilmington, 391 A.2d 205, 208 (Del. 1978)
(“For equity to assume jurisdiction . . . the danger to which the plaintiff is exposed must be a real
one.” (citing JOHN N. POMEROY & SPENCER W. SYMONS POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 251 (5th ed 1995))).
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harm into the fabric of their decisions to evince some degree of proportionality between the severity of Shawe and Elting’s corporate dissension and
the extremity of the ordered custodial sale. The courts’ intentional in-depth,
albeit unnecessary, analysis of Section 226(a)(2)’s irreparable harm requirement—despite its peripheral relevance to the case’s outcome—
persuades the conclusion that the courts may have been aware of how truly
drastic the unprecedented remedy of an ordered custodial sale really was.
B. The Delaware Supreme Court Incorrectly Affirmed the Court of
Chancery’s Enormous and Unprecedented Grant of Power to the
Appointed Custodian
In affirming the Court of Chancery’s decision to appoint a custodian to
sell the Company to a third party, the Delaware Supreme Court ignored the
long-standing principle that “[t]he involvement of the Court of Chancery
and its custodian in the corporation’s business and affairs should be kept to
a minimum and should be exercised only insofar as the goals of fairness and
justice . . . require.”224 Section 226 jurisprudence has repeatedly spoken to
the reluctance with which the Court of Chancery imposes the “intrusive”
custodianship remedy225 and to the principle that a custodian’s authority
should be as narrowly tailored as possible.226 The Delaware Supreme Court
should have reversed and recognized (1) that the Court of Chancery could
have ordered a variety of less intrusive, incremental alternatives that would
have kept its decision consistent with the aforementioned two principles,
and (2) that the Court of Chancery’s equitable power under Section 226
does not include the authority to order a custodial sale despite shareholder
objections.
The court’s decision could have been less intrusive in several ways.
First, the court could have reversed with instructions to appoint a custodian,
for a specified period of time, vested with (1) a tie-breaking vote; and (2)
mediation powers—either as the courts in Giuricich and Miller did, where
the custodians were vested with the power to break ties on any issue about
which directors were deadlocked,227 or as the court in Bentas did, where the
custodian could only break the tie on issues “significant to managing the
corporation’s business and affairs.”228 This incremental remedy could have
potentially tempered the animosity between Shawe and Elting, who may
have been less inclined to act opportunistically knowing that their attempts
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
146.

Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982).
See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134, 138 and accompanying text.
Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 79 (Del. Ch. 2000); see text accompanying supra note
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would fail when the impartial third vote was cast. The Court of Chancery
summarily rejected this option, however, observing that “it would enmesh
an outsider and, by extension, the Court into matters of internal corporate
governance for an extensive period of time.”229 Importantly, in its reasoning, the court nowhere considered the appointment of a provisional tiebreaking custodian with a limited term as a viable “first step” in the corporate healing process; instead, it fixed its conclusion on the assumption that
the custodian’s role would be indefinite.
Second, the court could have affirmed the decision to appoint a custodian, and could have ordered that both Elting and Shawe be given an opportunity to confer and submit proposals suggesting different scopes of custodial authority—just as the court did in Miller.230 This may have
incentivized cooperation among the parties whom, at that point, would have
had to accept that custodianship was imminent and would have been more
inclined to agree upon the precise corporate role the custodian would come
to play. Third, the court could have forced a buy-out through a sealed bid
process whereby either Shawe or Elting would have been given time to secure financing and would have been given the option to bid on the Company. A forced buy-out would have resolved the deadlock while simultaneously giving Shawe or Elting a chance to maintain ownership of the dorm
room start-up that they built into a multi-million-dollar global giant.
Instead of implementing a less intrusive, incremental remedy in the
first instance and reassessing its ruling in the event of further dispute or
continued deadlock, the court accepted a one fell swoop excision in the
form of a custodial sale as an appropriate remedy to eliminate the likelihood
that dispute would recur altogether. In ruling as it did, the court essentially
signaled that shareholders in closely held corporations would be wise to exhaust every last option before petitioning the court for relief—shareholders
should be so deadlocked that they would be willing to risk a whole sale of
their company. Though this may seem like a positive result, it may discourage deadlocked directors and shareholders from seeking intra-corporate
recourse. For example, if an aggrieved fifty percent shareholder-director in
a closely held corporation cannot secure her counterpart’s cooperation in
resolving the deadlock between them and cannot compel such cooperation
because of the absence of a shareholders agreement, she now has two options. She can either (1) remain cemented in her ownership, thus allowing
the deadlock to persist and thus running the risk of accelerating her company’s demise; or (2) petition the court for a Section 226 custodial sale remedy. The second option gives the aggrieved shareholder an immediate exit—
229. In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB, No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB,
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *102 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015).
230. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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armed with an arsenal of facts detailing her partner’s lack of cooperation
and opportunistic behavior, she now has the power to skip bona fide negotiation efforts and jump right to the option of equitable judicial intervention.
And, that intervention may very well manifest itself in the form of a custodial sale—an ideal outcome, in this circumstance.
Additionally, the Delaware Supreme Court misinterpreted the bounds
of the Court of Chancery’s authority under Section 226, and improperly relied on distinguishable case law. As Justice Valihura explained in her dissent, there does not exist “a single case in the history of our Section 226 jurisprudence where a court has ordered a custodial sale of a company over a
stockholder’s objections.”231 In support of its proposition that “several
sources confirm the Court of Chancery’s broad authority under [Section
226], which includes ordering a sale,” the majority cited several cases,232 all
of which are distinguishable from Shawe v. Elting in that they involved
consent by all of the stockholders to a whole sale of the business. The majority expressly acknowledged this difference in a footnote, purporting to
demonstrate the Court of Chancery’s broad equitable discretion even
though the examples it cited all “involve[d] actions where the parties eventually agreed the business should be liquidated or sold.”233 Where stockholder consent to a court ordered sale is present, the remedy is significantly
less intrusive234 and is thus consistent with the long-standing principle that
the involvement of the Court of Chancery and its custodian should be kept
to a minimum.235 Absent stockholder consent, however, the court has never
ordered the sale of a corporation to a third party—it thus erred in doing so
in this instance. The Court of Chancery effectively forced divestiture of the
Shawes’ ownership interests without recognizing that the language and prior application of Section 226 failed to provide them with sufficient notice
that a remedy as drastic as a whole sale of their company may occur.236 As
Justice Valihura pointed out in her dissent, Section 226 fails to provide express notice to stockholders that they may be subject to giving up their

231. Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 171 (Del. 2017) (Valihura, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 163–64 n.36 (majority opinion) (citing Bentas v. Haseotes, No. 17223 NC, 2003
Del. Ch. LEXIS 24 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2003); Fulk v. Wash. Serv. Assocs., No. 17747-NC, 2002
Del. Ch. LEXIS 78 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002); In re Supreme Oil Co., Inc., No. 10618-VCL, 2015
Del. Ch. LEXIS 319 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015); Brown v. Rosenberg, No. 833, 1981 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 629 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1981)); see supra note 163.
233. Shawe, 157 A.3d at 163–64 n.36 (emphasis added). Justice Valihura also distinguished
these cases in her dissent, pointing to the presence of stockholder consent in each. Id. at 181 (Valihura, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 183 (Valihura, J., dissenting).
235. Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982).
236. See supra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.
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shares over their objection;237 it is thus unlikely that the Delaware General
Assembly intended to permit the Court of Chancery to order the whole sale
of a company to a third party, despite the absence of unanimous shareholder
consent.238
V. CONCLUSION
In Shawe v. Elting, the Delaware Supreme Court improperly affirmed
the Court of Chancery’s unprecedented decision to order the custodial sale
of a deadlocked corporation to a third party, despite stockholder objections.239 In doing so, the court trivialized the irreparable harm requirement
of Section 226(a)(2) and declined to holistically review the case law cited
by the Court of Chancery in support of its proposition that irreparable harm
may be deemed to encompass damage to “a corporation’s reputation,
goodwill, customer relationships, and employee morale.”240 The court also
failed to recognize the unprecedented nature of a custodial sale absent
stockholder consent and instead made a sweeping determination—without
due consideration of less intrusive and incremental alternatives—that the
Court of Chancery correctly concluded that whole sale was the only viable
way to “excise” Shawe and Elting’s dysfunction.241 In February 2018, the
Court of Chancery approved a $385 million cash purchase of the Company.242 The purchaser was an entity owned and managed exclusively by

237. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226 (1953) (containing no language that would provide shareholders with notice that their ownership interests may be affected absent their consent),
with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1953) (providing notice to stockholders objecting to a merger
that their shares may be subject to divestiture or cancellation upon majority approval); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 273 (1953) (providing notice to fifty-fifty shareholders that in the presence of
threshold circumstances, their venture may be dissolved despite one shareholder’s objection); and
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 303 (1953) (allowing a corporation filing for bankruptcy to, inter alia,
“make any change in its . . . capital stock” or “be dissolved”).
238. Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 173 (Del. 2017).
239. See discussion supra Part IV.
240. See discussion supra Part IV.A; In re Shawe & Elting LLC, No. 9661-CB, No. 9686-CB,
No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *93 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015).
241. See discussion supra Part IV. B; In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at
*103.
242. See In re TransPerfect Global, Inc., No. 9700-CB, No. 10449-CB, at 33 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15,
2018). The Company’s implied aggregate enterprise value was agreed upon and set at $770 million at the time of sale. Id. at 31.
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none other than Phillip Shawe;243 and like clockwork, Elting filed an appeal contesting the sale.244 As one news outlet aptly put it: “The saga of TransPerfect will
drag on a while longer.”245

243. Id.; see Jeff Neiburg, Chancery Court Approves Sale of TransPerfect, DEL. ONLINE, Feb.
15, 2018, https://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/business/2018/02/15/chancery-courtapproves-sale-transperfect/341189002/ (summarizing the details of the sale).
244. Elting Reportedly Files Appeal on Chancery-led Sale of Company, DEL. BUS. INSIDER,
Feb. 26, 2018, https://delawarebusinessnow.com/2018/02/eating-reportedly-files-appeal-chanceryled-sale-company/.
245. Id.

